

Message Text

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LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, SG, PBOR, ML, UV, SS, ET, PO, UR, FR

SUBJ: DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY BROWN'S MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT SENGHOR.

1. SUMMARY: IN FEBRUARY 15 MEETING WITH DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY BROWN, PRESIDENT SENGHOR COMMENTED ON VARIOUS
SUBJECTS, INCLUDING HIS PLANNED VISIT TO U.S., MIDDLE
EAST, SPANISH SAHARA, ETHIOPIA, PORTUGAL,
SENEGALESE-SOVIET RELATIONS, SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THE
VOLTAN-MALIAN BORDER DISPUTE. END SUMMARY.

2. JUST BACK FROM A SUCCESSFUL WEEK'S TOUR IN THE INTERIOR,
PRESIDENT SENGHOR, RELAXED IN TURTLE NECK SPORTS SHIRT,
RECEIVED DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY AND MRS BROWN AT PRESIDENTIAL
PALACE, FEB 15, ACCCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR.

3. SENGHOR EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT SEEING BROWNS ONCE AGAIN IN
DAKAR, WHERE HE FELT THEY SERVED SO EFFECTIVELY FROM 1967
TO 70. HE THANKED THEM FOR GREETINGS FROM THE PRESIDENT AND
THE SECRETARY AND SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO VISITING U.S.
IN MAY FOR INTERNATIONAL PEN CLUB LECTURE HE WOULD GIVE IN NEW
YORK AND BEFORE STATE VISIT TO MEXICO. BROWN NOTED HIS DELIGHT
IN BEING ABLE TO STOP IN DAKAR IN CONNECTION WITH HIS MISSION
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AS PRESIDENT FORD'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE GAMBIA'S

10TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS AND PARTICULARLY IN SEEING
SENGHOR IN SUCH GOOD HEALTH AND SPIRITS. BROWN SAID HE
UNDERSTOOD THAT PRESIDENT SENGHOR HOPED TO COME TO
WASHINGTON DURING MAY VISIT.

4. NOTING THAT BROWN'S MOST RECENT MISSION AS AMBASSADOR
HAD BEEN TO JORDAN, SENGHOR TURNED TO MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM.
SECRETARY KISSINGER'S PERSISTENT EFFORTS FOR A PERMANENT
SETTLEMENT OF THE BASIC ISSUES WERE ENCOURAGING, AND HE FELT
SECRETARY'S CURRENT TRIP WAS BRINGING KIND OF CONCRETE RESULTS
SO URGENTLY NEEDED. BROWN underscored IMPORTANCE OF REAL
PROGRESS TOWARD SECURING PEACE AT THIS TIME WHEN THREATS OF
WAR MOUNTED FROM BOTH ARABS AND ISRAELIS. SENGHOR FELT
SECRETARY'S PROGRESS WITH SYRIANS WAS CRITICAL ACHIEVEMENT,
AND AS RESULT IT APPEAR PRESIDENT ASAD QUIETLY WAS TRYING TO
LESSEN SOVIET INFLUENCE ON DECISIONS IN DAMASCUS. SENEGAL
CONTINUED ITS EFFORTS TO HAVE MODERATING ROLE WITH ARAB
STATES. ITS RELATIONS WERE GENERALLY GOOD, PARTICULARLY WITH
MAGHREB NATIONS. ON RETURN FROM PORTUGAL EARLIER THIS MONTH HE
SOUGHT TO SOFTEN KING HASSAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SPAIN ON
SAHARA TERRITORY QUESTION. HOWEVER, WHEN HE CONVEYED
MOROCCO'S VIEWS TO SPANISH AMBASSADOR IN DAKAR, HE WAS TOLD
PROBLEM WAS COMPLICATED BY SPAIN'S HISTORIC TENDENCY TO PLAY
DON QUIXOTE IN ITS FOREIGN RELATIONS, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY
BY FACT THAT FRANCO WAS DYING.

5. SENGHOR EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN WITH EVENTS IN
ETHIOPIA, AND HE FEARED CURRENT ATTITUDES AND ACTIVITIES
SOME ARAB STATES WERE NOT HELPFUL. THEREFORE, HE HAD
DISPATCHED FOREIGN MINISTER ASSANE SECK TO OAU IN
ADDIS ABABA WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO BE FIRM ON ISSUE OF
NON-INTERVENTION. WHILE HE EARLIER HAD ASKED NEW RULING
JUNTA TO SPARE LIFE OF HAILE SELASSIE, HE STEERED CLEAR
OF INTERFERING IN ETHIOPIA'S INTERNAL RELATIONS. AFRICAN LEADERS,
MUCH LESS ARAB STATESMEN, SHOULD NOT TRY TO TELL
ETHIOPIANS WHAT ATTITUDES TO TAKE TOWARD ERITREAN
INSURGENTS. HE HAD ALWAYS OPPOSED MINI STATES, AND NATIONS
SHOULD AVOID ENCOURAGING BREAKAWAY PRECEDENTS THAT WOULD
LEAD TO AFRICA'S FURTHER FRACTIONING. ALREADY THERE WERE TOO
MANY QUESTIONABLE ENTITIES LIKE MALDIVE ISLANDS WITH
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EQUAL VOICES IN SOME COUNCILS WITH MAJOR POWERS
SUCH AS U.S.

6. COMMENTING ON CURRENT SITUATION IN PORTUGAL, SENGHOR
SAID HE FELT POSITION OF SOARES AND SOCIALISTS SEEMED
STRENGTHENED, AND HE BELIEVED THEY MIGHT BE SUCCESSFUL IN
MAINTAINING UPPER HAND WITH COMMUNISTS AND ULTIMATELY IN
BREAKING AWAY FROM THEIR PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER,

COMMUNIST PARTIES WERE REAL POLITICAL THREATS IN EUROPE TODAY. IN FRANCE, THOUGH, HE SAW COMING DIVORCE BETWEEN SOCIALISTS AND COMMUNISTS.

7. SOVIETS REMAINED MAJOR THREAT IN AFRICA, WITH THEIR INCREASING NUMBERS AND ACTIVITIES, SENGHOR SAID, BUT HE WOULD LIMIT THEM IN SENEGAL ESSENTIALLY TO CULTURAL EXCHANGE. HIS THREE PLANNED VISITS TO MOSCOW, AT USSR INVITATION, WERE ALL ABORTED; THEREFORE, HE HAD ABANDONED THE IDEA. HE ADMITTED CURRENT BIAS TOWARD CPR, BUT HE UNDERSTOOD NEED FOR US-USSR COOPERATION IN INTEREST OF DETENTE.

8. SENGHOR REITERATED THAT HE FREQUENTLY TOLD AMBASSADOR MAIN DIFFERENCE IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY WAS ON INDOCHINA AND KOREA, WHERE HE FELT U.S. GAVE TOO MUCH WEIGHT TO FEAR OF COMMUNISTS. IN HIS VIEW, REGIMES AND INSURGENTS FROM NORTH WERE ESSENTIALLY NATIONALISTS. BROWN POINTED OUT U.S. INTERESTS AND COMMITMENTS IN AREA WERE CONSIDERABLE. CONGRESS NOW CAREFULLY CONSIDERING QUESTION OF LEVEL OF OUR SUPPORT TO ESTABLISHED REGIMES THERE. SENGHOR AGREED THAT INTERESTS CHANGED PERSPECTIVES ON FOREIGN ISSUES. SO HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO DECLARE PUBLICLY THAT HE UNDERSTOOD WHY U.S., U.K., AND FRANCE FELT NEED TO VETO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO EXPEL SOUTH AFRICA FROM UN WHILE SENEGAL COULD VOTE FOR MEASURE. BROWN REMINDED SENGHOR OF DANGERS OF PRECEDENT IN SUCH CASES, WHICH COULD AND HAD CAUSED SERIOUS PROBLEMS, AS WITH UNESCO VOTE ON ISRAEL, AND WHICH COULD EXTEND EXPULSION TO ANY MEMBER STATE.

9. SENGHOR SAID HE WAS ADVANCING HIS DEPARTURE TO MALI AND WOULD LEAVE MONDAY FOR BAMAKO AND GO ON FROM THERE TO OUAGADOUGOU TO TRY TO HELP SETTLE MALI-UPPER VOLTA
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DISPUTE. ONE PROBLEM WAS FACT BOTH PRESIDENTS, TRAORE AND LAMIZANA, WERE SOLDIERS, AND THEIR FIRST THOUGHTS WERE FOR MILITARY SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS. ALL THE SAME, SENGHOR FELT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP. SENEGAL AND THE GAMBIA HAD HAD SIMILAR PROBLEMS, BUT THEY WERE SOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AT CONFERENCE TABLE. BROWN NOTED U.S. POSITION OF NON-INVOLVEMENT IN MALI-UPPER VOLTA DISPUTE AND OUR RESISTANCE TO APPEALS FOR ARMS FROM ONE OF THE PARTIES.
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